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Abstract
We study the evolution of the influence of journals over the period 1970-2017. In the
early 1970's, a number of journals had similar influence, but by 1995, the `Top 5' journals
 QJE, AER, RES, Econometrica, and JPE  had acquired a major lead. This dominance
has remained more or less unchanged since 1995. To place these developments in a broader
context, we also study trends in sociology. The trends there have gone the other way  the
field journals rose in influence, relative to the Top General journals. A model of journals as
platforms is developed to understand these trends across time and across disciplines.
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1 Introduction
One aspect of the organisation of economic research that has attracted a lot of attention is
the importance accorded to publications in top journals, in particular to the so-called Top 5
journals.1 At many departments, publishing in Top 5 journals appears to be highly correlated
with promotion. The editors and the referees of these journals are concentrated in a few leading
American departments. This has raised a broader concern about insularity and pressures to
conform in the profession. For a discussion of these concerns, see Angrist, Azoulay, Ellison, Hill,
and Lu (2020), Fourcade, Ollion, and Algan (2015) and Heckman and Moktan (2020).2
This discussion motivates a close examination of the evidence on the quality of journals in
economics. Do a few top journals really stand out relative to the others and has it always been
the case? Is the dominance of a few general journals a feature specific to economics? If so, what
is it about economics that creates this hierarchy?
Judging the quality of research is a complex problem. In our work, we measure quality in
terms of citations. While citation offers a particular perspective on quality or the importance of
a paper, the big advantage is that data on citations is available for a large set of journals and
across a long period of time. Moreover, citation data is also available across disciplines. This
allows for systematic comparisons. For a discussion on the uses of citations as a measure of the
quality of research, see Hirsch (2005) and Hamermesh (2018).
We start by presenting evidence on the evolution of citations of journals over a period from
1970 until 2017. In particular, following Ellison (2002), we use the ratio of citations between
different journals as a measure of the relative influence of journals. As in his paper, we consider
three sets of journals
• The Top 5.
• Three general interest journals  Economic Journal, International Economic Review, and
Review of Economics and Statistics.
• Well known field journals  Journal of International Economics, Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, Journal of Econometrics, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Urban Economy,
Journal of Monetary Economy, Rand Journal of Economics, Journal of Public Economics,
Journal of Law and Economics and Journal of Development Economics.
The influence ratio is computed as the average Impact Factor (hereafter, IF) of field journals
1This refers to American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Review of Economic
Studies, and Quarterly Journal of Economics. Indeed, in a recent paper, a senior economist has used the word
top5itis to describe the focus of the profession on these journals, see Serrano (2018).
2The 2017 AEA Annual Meeting had a panel discussion on this topic: Publishing and Promotion in Economics:
The Curse of the Top Five, which can be viewed at https: //www.aeaweb.org/conference/webcasts/2017.
In this connection, also see Card and DellaVigna (2013) for a careful discussion of trends in publishing in the top
5 journals.
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or prominent general interest as a ratio of the average Impact Factor of Top 5.3 We consider the
time series of these ratios from 1975 until 2017.
Figure 1 summarizes our findings. In the early 1970's, Tier 2 general interest journals and
Top field journals had an influence that was relatively similar to that of the Top 5 journals. But
the difference in influence between the Top 5 journals and other journals grew rapidly over the
1980s and 1990s. By 1995, the influence of Top 5 journals was four to five times the influence of
Tier 2 and Top field journals. In the period after 1995, the Tier 2 journals somewhat recovered
their standing so that the situation in 2017 was similar to what it was in the mid 1980's. The
standing of Top field journals appears to have remained relative stable: the ratio in 2017 is
similar to what it was in 1995.
To understand these trends we also examine the evolution of the structure of the citation
network among these 17 journals, over time. Figure 4 presents snap shots of the citation structure
at four points in time  1977, 1987, 1997, 2017. These snap shots show that in the 1970's the
journals were closely interconnected and all of them had a similar level of `centrality'. By 1997
this had changed, with a clear separation emerging between the Top 5 and the rest of the journals:
the Top 5 were closely interconnected among themselves, the rest of the journals cited the Top 5
but hardly cited any of the other journals. This core-periphery structure became more sharply
delineated in the years after 1997.
We develop a model to understand the reasons for these trends. In this model, there is a set
of authors spread across research fields. Authors get ideas and they seek to publish in journals
that are widely read. There is a journal for every field  that publishes papers from that field
only  and there is a general interest journal  that publishes papers from every field. It is
assumed that every author reads the journal in his field and that a fraction of authors read the
general interest journal. Every journal has a capacity that determines the number of papers it
can publish. Journals accept the best papers submitted to them, subject to meeting this capacity.
We show that there are three main forces at work: the number of fields, the readership of the
general journal, and the capacity of the journals. If the number of fields times the readership
of the general journal is small then the field journal publishes the best quality papers, if it is
large then the general journal publishes the best papers. In the intermediate range, there exist
multiple equilibria: they include the two equilibria outlined above but there also exist asymmetric
3More formally, consider field journals. Fix a year T . Compute the number of citations at T of all articles in
these journals that were published in the preceding 5 years, from year T −5 until T −1. Divide the total citations
by the number of articles published over these years. Place the number obtained in the numerator. Similarly,
compute the citations at T for articles published in a top 5 journal over the years T − 5 until T − 1 and divide
the total citations by the number of articles published over this period. This gives us the number of citations
normalized by the number of papers. Divide the first number by the second number. This gives us the ratio for
year T. We consider the time series of this ratio from 1975 until 2017.
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equilibria with different standing of general and field journals across the fields. The capacity of
the journals is clearly important. Suppose the equilibrium is one in which the general journal
dominates. If capacity in a field journal grows, the journal will be willing to accept a lower
quality paper and this will lower the ratio of quality of this journal versus the general journal.
We use the model as a lens through which to view the evolution of economics. We show that
through the 1980's and early 1990's there were two major developments. The first development
was a significant growth in the scale of economics  in terms of number of journals and papers
published. The second development was a standardization of the economics PhD programme
and the increasing dominance of the American model of graduate education in economics. The
latter was highly correlated with changes in the broader environment of the discipline that shifted
markedly in favor of mainstream economics and is best reflected in the prominence of Ronald
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, and in the collapse of communism. This historical moment
was perhaps best captured in the 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man, by Francis
Fukuyama. In our view these two developments taken together moved the key parameters 
number of fields and the readership of the general journal. In line with the predictions of the
theory, this in turn led to a rise in status of the Top 5 general journals.
In the period after 1995, the empirical trend in growth of research has persisted over this
period. The model suggests that an increase in number of fields will further lower the journal
impact ratio of the Top field journals relative to the general journal. This is broadly in line with
the empirical trend for the Top Field journals  a small decline in their influence ratio.
By way of a robustness check we examine trends in one other social science: sociology. We
consider three top general interest journals  American Journal of Sociology, American Socio-
logical Review, Social Forces  and we consider 6 Top Field journals  Administrative Science
Quarterly, Demography, Journal of Health and Social Behavior, Social Networks, Social Psychol-
ogy Quarterly, Social Science & Medicine. We find that in the period 1975 to 1995, there was
an increase in influence of top field journals relative to the top 3 journals. This persisted after
1995. As a result, by 2017, top field journals were on average only slightly less influential as
compared to general interest journals. Moreover, particular field journals such as Administrative
Science Quarterly or Journal of Health and Social Behaviour were actually more influential than
the three general interest journals, for stretches of time. Thus the trends in sociology were quite
different as compared to economics.
Our model helps us understand this difference. In the model, other things being equal, an
expansion in a field can lead to a higher quality of that field journal, relative to the general
journal. We find that there was relatively modest growth in the overall scale of research in
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sociology. There also appears to have been no major large scale change in the broader intellectual
environment comparable to economics. Indeed, Angrist et al. (2020) and Fourcade et al. (2015)
show that economics is relatively more insular as compared to the other social sciences  sociology,
political science and anthropology.4 In particular, Fourcade et al. (2015) have argued that a
major distinguishing feature of economics, relative to sociology, is the much stronger cohesion
of economics: different fields within sociology are less well integrated  they do not cite each
other a great deal more than their citations of non-sociology journals.5 By contrast, economics
journals rarely cite research outside economics. Putting together the lack of a major expansion
in sociology with the lack of cohesion, and viewing this through the lens of the model, suggests
that as a field grows (possibly due to exogenous reasons), we expect that the top journal in that
field will grow in relative importance. This is indeed what we observe throughout the 1970-2017
period.
Our paper is a contribution to the study of research in economics. Notable contributions in
this field include Angrist et al. (2020), Bergstrom (2007), Card and DellaVigna (2013), Ellison
(2002, 2013), Hamermesh (2013, 2018) and Heckman and Moktan (2020). A major recurring
theme is the standing of different journals (especially the Top 5), how that affects the attrac-
tiveness of doing research in economics and how that in turn shapes the types of questions that
are studied by economists. Our paper provides perhaps the first comprehensive description of
the trends in the influence of top economics journals over a period stretching over almost five
decades, from 1970 until 2017. We build on the work of Hamermesh (2018) in using citations
as a yardstick for quality, and we borrow the relative influence ratio from Ellison (2002). In his
work, Ellison (2002) noted that in the 1980s, and the 1990s, Tier 2 general interest journals and
field journals had lost influence relative to Top 5 journals. We show that this decline of Tier 2
journals and Top field journals is robust: it persists from 1995 to 2017. Moreover, this dominance
and the trends in it are confirmed when we consider a variety of other measures. Moreover, we
place this development in a broader context of social science by presenting a study of journal
influence of sociology. We find, somewhat surprisingly, that the trends in sociology actually go
the other way  leading to a decline in the standing of the top general journals  over a similar
period of time. We develop a model of journals as platforms to identify factors that can help
account for different trajectories of journal influence across time and across disciplines.
We would like to draw out the relationship with a recent paper by Heckman and Moktan
(2020): their work focuses on the importance of top 5 publications in career progression of
4Angrist et al. (2020) also show that economics is becoming less insular over time and that it was more outward
looking than psychology by 2015.
5For a study of co-authorship patterns in sociology that bears on the integration of the discipline, see Moody
(2004). For a similar study in economics, see Goyal, van der Leij, and Moraga-González (2006).
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economists in top departments in the United States. They argue that this focus on a few top
journals is unjustified as a significant ratio of important papers are published in journals outside
the Top 5. We complement their cross sectional finding by showing that there is a very strong
trend in the dominance of Top 5 and that this dominance was established by the mid 1990's and
that it has remained relatively stable after 1995.
Our model of journals as platforms is inspired by the literature on platform competition,
influential early contributions include Armstrong (2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2003). Unlike
most of the research in this field, we do not focus on the role of `platforms' in choosing prices. The
owners of the platforms play a relatively passive role in our model. Instead, we use the `platform'
to develop intuitions about externalities in two-sided settings  in particular, this allows us to
draw out the role of the size of different sides of the market, the capacity of the journal, and
the value of different platforms (the readership of the general journal)  in shaping the relative
attractiveness of journals. The main contribution of our paper lies in the use we make of this
approach to the empirical study of the relative influence of journals.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the trends in journal
influence in economics. In Section 3 we show that the observed trends are robust to the influence
measure used. In Section 4 we present a theoretical model of platform competition between
journals that helps understanding the trends in journal influence. In Section 5 we repeat the
analysis for journals in sociology. Section 6 concludes.
2 Trends in Journal Influence
This section presents the empirical trends on the influence of economic journals. We start with
a description of the data sets.
2.1 Data Sources
The citation data comes from Web of Science (hereafter, WoS). WoS is an information system
containing more than 20,000 journals, books, and conference proceedings that include over 80
million records of the most relevant journals (Clarivate Analytics 2018).6
Following Ellison (2002), we consider 17 highly ranked journals that can be classified into
three categories: nine Top Field, the Top 5 journals and three Tier 2 general interest journals.
Table 1 presents the journals in each group.7
6WoS is widely used in economics of science: out of the 45 articles reviewed in Bornmann, Butz, and Wohlrabe
(2018), 26 articles used the WoS as the primary source of information.
7We also include the new influential journals that appeared in the 2000s, such as the American Economic
Journals, Economic Theory, Quantitative Economics and the Journal of the European Economic Association in
the robustness section.
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We created two data sets on citations. The first data set, hereafter known as the Top-Journals
data set, considers all the articles published between 1970 and 2017 in each of the 17 journals.8
The Top-Journals data set includes all citations from the universe of WoS that each item received
every year following its publication date. This data set is considered in Section 2.2.
Table 1: Top Journal Groups
Category Journals
Top 5
American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Eco-
nomics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, and Review of Economic Stud-
ies.
Tier 2 Economic Journal, Review of Economics and Statistics, International
Economic Review.
Top Field
Journals
Journal of International Economics, Journal of Econometrics, Journal
of Economic Theory, Journal of Urban Economy, Journal of Monetary
Economy9, Rand Journal of Economics10, Journal of Public Economics,
Journal of Development Economics, and the Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics.
The Top-journals data set does not contain information on individual citations, that is, it does
not tell us from which articles the citations came from. This led us to create a second data set,
hereafter known as the 100-Journals data set. This data set includes information on individual
citations on 100 important journals in economics (including the 17 previously mentioned). While
it is not the complete universe of relevant journals in economics, the sample is large enough to
cover the journals that account for the most significant share of citations that top journals
receive. We select the relevant journals from the "Simple Rank" list of "All Years" published
by IDEAS/RePEc.12 The 100-Journals data set includes the complete set of references for each
article published in the 100 journals. The list of journals is in Appendix A; the selection of
the list was based on a list retrieved from https://ideas.repec.org/top/ on May 2018. The
citation data itself was retrieved from the Web of Science. Thus, this data set allows us to track
which journals are citing each of the top journals and in what year they are citing them. We
8We excluded articles that had the word `Foreword', `Note', `Comment', `Preface', `Remarks', `Reply', `Pro-
ceedings', `Introduction', `Fellow', `Annual meeting', `In memoriam', `Untitled', `Summary' and `Memories' in the
title. This reduced the number of articles from 277,284 to 264,241. This selection did not exclude research articles
in `Papers and Proceedings' issues and these are included in the data set.
9Also covers articles in the Papers and Proceedings issue. This was done as the official impact factor as
published in the Journal Citation Reports includes the Papers and Proceedings issue as well in its calculations.
10This covers its predecessor Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy.
11This covers its predecessor Bell Journal of Economics.
12IDEAS is a web portal run by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and uses the
RePEc (Reseach Papers in Economics) database to rank economic journals, among other objectives. Dedicated
exclusively to economic research, IDEAS currently has over 2,500,000 items of research, and it is therefore con-
sidered a focal point for many economists. Due to its large coverage and relevance in economics, IDEAS was
considered the main reference to identify the universe of journals.
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analyse this data set in Sections 2.3 and 3.
2.2 Journal Influence
Our first measure of influence is the impact factor, first described by Garfield (1955). It is a
standard indicator of a journal's influence widely used to rank journals in economics (Liebowitz
and Palmer (1984), Laband and Piette (1994), Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, and Stengos (2003),
and Engemann and Wall (2009)). The p-years impact factor, IF pi,t, of journal i in year t is
calculated as
IF pi,t =
∑t−1
s=t−p ci,s,t∑t−1
s=t−p ni,s
, (1)
where ci,s,t is the number of citations that the articles of journal i published in year s received
from articles published in any journal in year t, and ni,s is the number of articles that journal i
published in year s. This measure has an intuitive appeal  a journal that gets more citations
per article is more influential than a journal that receives fewer citations. Since the late 1970s,
Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) has provided a large sample of citation data that facilitates
the computation of this measure, see Liebowitz and Palmer (1984).13
Following Ellison (2002), we calculate the p-year impact factor ratio (IFRpi,t) of journal i in
year t as:
IFRpi,t =
IF pi,t∑
j∈Top5
IF pj,t
5
. (2)
This measure allows temporal comparisons of the evolution of the relative influence of journals
across time. We consider a 5-year impact factor ratio, the results are robust to 2 and 10-year
impact factors.14
Using the Top-Journals data set, we calculate the impact factor ratio of our list of journals.
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the average impact factor ratio of Tier 2 and Top Field journals
relative to Top 5. This figure reveals two interesting trends:
1. A dramatic decline in the impact factor ratio of the Tier 2 and Top Field journals in the
period from 1975 until 1995. In particular, the impact factor ratio of Tier 2 to Top 5
13The Social Science Citation Index is currently owned by Clarivate Analytics. The calculation of the official
Journal Impact Factor as published by Clarivate has a peculiar asymmetry between the numerator and the
denominator; the denominator only counts citable items (research articles and reviews) whereas the nominator
counts all articles (including editorials, obituaries etc.), see Larivière and Sugimoto (2019). We did not follow
this peculiarity and considered citable items only in the calculation of IF pi,t, see also Footnote 7.
14Ellison (2002) used a slight variation of impact factor in his calculations. His version is defined as IF pi,t =∑t
s=t−p−1 ci,s,t
n∗i,p
. There are two main differences with the standard definition. First, he considered articles that were
published on the reference year. Second, due to the lack of data, he estimated the number of articles published
during the t years preceding year p in journal i (n∗i,p) based on the growth of articles of American Economic
Review. We use the standard definition of Impact Factor, as it is widely reported on websites and journal citation
reports.
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Figure 1: The evolution of the Impact Factor Ratio of the Top Field journals and Tier 2 journals
in Economics relative to Top 5 journals.
dropped from 0.55 to 0.20, while that of Top Field to Top 5 declined from 0.63 to 0.38. To
get a sense of what this means for the number of citations we note that the average article
in a Top 5 journal received around 82% more citations than the average Tier 2 article in
1975. This number went up to 400% by 1995. Articles in Top 5 journals received around
59% more citations than those in Top Field journals in 1980, but they received about 163%
more citations in 1999.
2. A partial reversal of these trends for Tier 2 after 2000. By 2017, the impact factor ratio
of Tier 2 was 0.48; this difference was comparable to the situation in the early-1980s. In
contrast, the influence gap for Top Field journals remains stable after 1995. The upward
trends in Tier 2 journals after 1995 are striking and appear to go against the common
perception.
The changes in the relative status of journals is nicely summarized in a comparison of the
evolution of the Journal of Economic Theory (JET) and Review of Economics and Statistics
(ReStat), relative to the American Economic Review. We see here clearly the sharp difference
in the fortunes of the Top theory journal and the top Tier 2 empirical journal. In the period
1975-1995, the impact factor ratio of JET and ReSTAT fell sharply. The impact factor ratio of
ReSTAT recovered significantly after 1995, while the status of JET declined further.
We turn finally to the impact factor ratio of individual field journals. Prior to 2000, the impact
factor ratio of each of the Top field journals decreased. Figure 3 reveals that the impact factor
ratios of the field journals have converged by 2000: the impact factor ratio of those fields with
8
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Figure 2: The evolution of the Impact Factor Ratio of the Journal of Economic Theory and the
Review of Economic Statistics relative to the American Economic Review.
low impact factors has increased, while the ratio of those fields with initially higher impact factor
has decreased. The only exception is the Journal of Economic Theory, which has experienced a
continuous decline.
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Figure 3: Impact factor ratio per journal
To summarize,
Observation 1. We identify three trends in the influence of top journals in economics.
• Period prior to 1995: starting from a relatively equal level in early 1970's, Top 5 journals
demonstrated a sharp increase in their influence and distanced themselves from other top
journals.
• Period after 1995: Tier 2 journals reduced the influence gap with Top 5 journals, but the
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gap between the Top Field journals and Top 5 remained stable.
• Over the period 1970-2017: there was convergence in the relative standing of the different
field journals.
2.3 Citation Network
In this section, we investigate more deeply the citations between the top journals in the 100-
Journals data set. The data set we created comprises journal to journal citation relations. To be
consistent with the time span of the impact factor, we consider only citations between articles
that differ at most five years in year of publication. Specifically, we grouped the references of
(i.e., citations from) the articles published in a journal j at t to other articles published in our
100-Journals list in t − 4 to t. Thus, a citing relation between two journals means a reference
(citation given) in t to any other publication in the 100-Journals data covering the t − 4 to t
period. We rely on citation networks to illustrate the evolution of journal to journal citations
over time. In the citation network, the nodes are individual journals and the edges are values
according to the shares of references from the source journal j to the target journal k. The share
is obtained as the number of references from journal j to journal k relative to the total number of
references from journal j to the other 100-Journals. The citations are directional (edges) because
a citation from journal j to journal k differs from a citation from k to j.
Figure 4 presents the evolution of the citation network across time by presenting snapshots
for 1977, 1987, 1997, and 2017. Top 5 journals are in red, Tier 2 journals are in green, and the
Top Field journals are in blue. To keep the graph as clean as possible, the edges that represent
less than 5% of the citations of the journal are not included. The location of a journal in this
figure is based on its Article Influence Score (AIS). The AIS takes into account the citations of
the papers that cite a particular paper, so it weights the citations recursively (see Section 3 for a
formal definition). The journal with the maximum Article Influence Score (AIS) is located in the
inner circle; the other journals are located at a distance to the inner circle in proportion to their
AIS (relative to the maximum). The middle circle indicates an AIS that is half the maximum,
the outer circle indicates an AIS of 0. The first observation is that this figure supports the
growing dominance of the Top 5 journals. But the figure offers a more detailed picture of how
citations are structured across journals and how that structure has changed over time and how
this can account for the rising dominance of the Top 5.
At the start, most of the journals had similar centrality  this is captured by their presence
in the central circle. As we move into the 1980's and the 1990's, we see that the Tier 2 and Top
Field journals have been pushed out of the central circle while the Top 5 move into the circle and
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remain in it for the rest of the period. The figure also brings out one other important feature of
the structure of citations: the Top 5 journals have a dense set of connections among themselves,
there are very few connections between the field journals, and the field journals cite the Top 5
journals. The situation with Tier 2 is a little more complicated: they are connected to Top 5
journals, have few connections with each other, and are only weakly connected to a couple of
Top Field journals each.
This suggests that authors in a field recognize their own top field journal and the Top 5
general interest journals, but there is almost no recognition for research in other fields. This is
a key building block for the theoretical model presented in section 4.
We summarize the discussion in:
Observation 2. The citation network of economic journals reveals that:
• In the 1970's, a number of general and field journals were at the centre of the discipline.
• In the period leading to 1997, there emerges of a core-periphery structure. The Top 5
journals constitute the core and Tier 2 and Top Field journals constitute the periphery.
The Top 5 journals cite each other intensively, the Field and Tier 2 journals cite the Top
5 but do not cite each other at all.
• In the period after 1997, the core-periphery structure is further consolidated.
3 Robustness
This section presents two alternative measures of journal influence  Article Influence Score (a
page rank type measure that takes into account the influence of the journal that cites a paper)
and the fraction of top cited papers published. We also briefly study the trends in citations
of some prominent new journals that have been introduced over the past two decades. These
investigations suggest that the principal trends identified in the previous section are robust.
The Impact Factor does not take into account the source of the citations: in other words, it
gives the same weight to a citation in a top journal as to a low influential journal. Pinski and
Narin (1976) developed an indicator, that is called Influence Weight, which gives more weight
to citations from journals that themselves have a high Influence Weight. Formally, for journals
i ∈ J and j ∈ J , let cij be the number of references in journal i that cite journal j, and let
si =
∑
j cij be the total number of references in journal i. Then the Influence Weight IWi of
journal i is the solution to
IWi =
∑
j∈J
cji
sj
IWj , (3)
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Figure 4: The Emerging Core-Periphery Structure
Note: the journal citation network was calculated for citations between 100 economic journals, see Ap-
pendix A for a full list. We show 17 journals in this figure: the five Top 5 journals (red), the three Tier
2 journals (green), and nine Top Field journals (blue) (we have added Journal of Law and Economics to
the list of 8 presented earlier). Only citation links that covered at least 5% of the outgoing citations of a
journal are shown.
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that is, the principal eigenvector of the row-normalized citation matrix
C := (
cij
si
)i,j∈J (4)
Normalising this measure by the number of articles ai of a journal, Pinski and Narin (1976)
obtains a measure called Influence Per Publication (IPP), that is,
IPPi = IWi/ai. (5)
Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) provide an axiomatic foundation for this index.
The IPP Index has been implemented in the Article Influence Score (AIS) of the EigenfactorTM
project (Bergstrom, West, and Wiseman (2008)). The AIS omits journal self-citations and en-
sures that the citation matrix is ergodic, see West and Bergstrom (2008) for details.15
We define a citation matrix C, each cell i, j in this matrix refers to the fraction of references
in articles published in journal i in year t, that cite articles published in journal j in year t− 5
to t − 1. We use the 100-Journals database, as it contains individual citations from article to
article. For a discussion of the data sources, see Section 2.1.
Figure 5 shows the trends of the ratio of the average AIS of Tier 2 and Top Field journals
relative to the average AIS of the Top 5 journals. The influence gap between Top 5 and other
top journals increased before 1995. After that, there was a reversal, though the magnitude of
this reversal was relatively modest (as compared to the pattern in the Impact ratio presented in
Figure 1). The figure also reveals that the gap between Top 5 and Top Field has continued to
widen after 1995. This is contrary to the trend in the Impact Ratio between the Top Field and
Top 5 journals after 1995.
As in the case of Impact Ratio, the trend toward convergence across the top Field journals
is also observed in the case of AIS after 1995 (see Figure 6).
The two measures we have looked at so far both focus on the `average' number of citations
per paper, which is not a good measure of centrality when the distribution is highly skewed
(as is the case for the citation distribution). We now turn to a more complete picture of the
distribution of citations. Specifically, we compute the 75th, 90th, 95th and 99th percentile of
the distribution of citations received in period t for articles published between t− 5 and t− 1.16
Figure 7 presents the ratio between the citations of Tier 2 and Top 5 journals and Top Field and
15West and Bergstrom (2008) define Eigenfactor EFi as the solution to EFi = α
∑
j∈J
cji
sj
EFj + (1−α) ai∑
j aj
,
as in PageRank Brin and Page (1998). Whereas West and Bergstrom choose the PageRank value of α = 0.85, we
set α = 1, to make it closer to the Influence Weight of Pinski and Narin (1976).
16We have also considered the median, but the median citations for Tier 2 was 0 in the 80s and 90s. Results
are available upon request.
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Figure 5: The evolution of the Article Influence Score Ratio of the Top Field journals and Tier
2 journals in Economics relative to Top 5 journals.
Top 5 journals, respectively. We note that the trends are similar to Figure 1.
In an interesting recent paper, Heckman and Moktan (2020) argue that a subject progresses
through important papers and examine the location of most cited papers across journals. We
build on their idea and define the ratio of most cited papers published in different journals. Our
interest is in the trends over time.17
We define ca,t as the number of citations that paper a (published in year s ≤ t) received from
any article in year t registered in WoS. Define ni,s as the number of articles published in journal
i in year s. We then define the proportion of papers in journal i that are in top 5% of citations
distribution at t:
IP 5i,t =
∑t−1
s=t−p(ci,s,t ≥ c¯5s,t)∑t−1
s=t−p ni,s
(6)
where c¯5s,t is 95
th percentile of the citation distribution ca,t of all articles published in year s in
one of the journals in the 100 journals list. As with the Impact Factor Ratio and the Article
Influence Score, we use articles published from t − 5 to t − 1, i.e. p = 5. IP 5i,t can be seen as
an estimate of the probability that a random paper published in journal i becomes a top 5%
cited paper. Note that if all 100 journals would have the same distribution in terms of citations
received, then all journals would have IP 5i,t = 0.05.
Then, the influence ratio for Tier 2 journals versus Top 5 journals is:
IPR5T ier2 =
∑
i∈T ier2 Z
5
i,t/3∑
i∈Top5 Z
5
i,t/5
(7)
17We also replicated the Heckman and Moktan (2020) analysis for our data; this is presented in Appendix B.
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Figure 6: Article Influence Score ratio per journal
Similarly, the influence ratio for Top Field journals is:
IPR5TopF ield =
∑
i∈TopF ield Z
5
i,t/8∑
i∈Top5 Z
5
i,t/5
(8)
Figure 8 shows the IPR-ratios obtained for the 95th percentile using journals in the Top 5, Tier
2 and Top Field group (17 journals).
The trends on ratio of top cited papers are broadly consistent with the trends on impact
factor ratio observed in Section 2. There was a steady decline in the fraction of top papers
published in the Tier 2 general interest journals and Top field journals, relative to the Top 5
journals, until 1995. After 1995, there has been a significant reversal with regard to the ratio of
top cited papers published in the Tier 2 general interest journals. The state of Top field journals
relative to Top 5 journals remains more or less unchanged after 1995.
Finally, we present the evolution of impact factor ratio of the new influential economics jour-
nals that appeared in the 2000s: American Economic Journals (Microeconomics, Macroeconomics
and Applied Economics), Theoretical Economics, Quantitative Economics and the Journal of the
European Economic Association. Figure 9a shows that the influence of the new journals increased
substantially from 2008 to 2017, the average impact factor of the new journals relative to the
average Top 5 increased from 0.20 in 2008 to 0.48 in 2016. Two journals contributed to this
upward trend (see Figure 9b), the Journal of the European Economic Association and the Amer-
ican Economic Journals Applied-Economics, both journals present an upward trend in contrast
to the downward trend of the historical Top Field during the same period. The Journal of the
15
Tier 2
Top Field
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Av
er
ag
e 
99
th
 p
er
ce
nt
ile
 ra
tio
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Publication year
Tier 2
Top Field
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Av
er
ag
e 
95
th
 p
er
ce
nt
ile
 ra
tio
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Year of study
Tier 2
Top Field
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Av
er
ag
e 
90
th
 p
er
ce
nt
ile
 ra
tio
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Year of study
Tier 2
Top Field
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Av
er
ag
e 
75
th
 p
er
ce
nt
ile
 ra
tio
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Publication year
Figure 7: Ratio of Percentiles
Tier 2
Top Field
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Av
er
ag
e 
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 to
p 
5%
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Year of study
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European Economic Association increased its impact factor ratio from 0.19 in 2008 to 0.70 in
2016. The influence of the AEJ-Applied Economics also increased relative to the average Top 5
from 0.52 in 2014 to 0.78 in 2017.
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4 A model of journals as platforms
There are F = {1, 2, . . . , F} fields of research. For each field f ∈ F , there is a single journal f ,
and a continuum of authors of measure nf > 0 (also referred to as the field size). The authors
are also the readers of the papers published in journal f . In addition, there is a general interest
journal g that attracts readers from all fields. In particular, we assume that in field f ∈ F a
fraction αf ∈ (0, 1] of the mass of authors reads the general journal; hence, the readership of the
general journal is ng =
∑
f∈F αfnf .
Every author i is endowed with an original idea of value vi ∈ R+. The density of authors
working in field f with an idea of value vi is nfh(vi), where h(vi) is a probability density function,
the same in every field. The cumulative distribution function associated with h(v) is denoted
by H(v). We assume that h(v) is positive for every v ∈ R+. Authors use their idea to write a
paper. The value of the idea is the same as the quality of the paper. Every author can choose
to submit their paper to either their own field journal, the general journal or not to submit it at
all.
A journal j ∈ F ∪ {g} has a capacity: it can publish at most a mass of κj articles, where
κf + κg < nf , ∀f ∈ F . In other words, the number of authors in any field is greater than
the combined publication capacity of the field journal and the general interest journal. Journal
capacity is exogenous. The journal accepts the highest quality submissions until capacity is
satiated.
Authors in all fields simultaneously decide to which journal they wish to submit their paper:
the field journal f , the general interest journal g, or not to publish at all. The strategy of an
author in field f with an idea of quality v, is a function df (v) ∈ {f, g, ∅} where df (v) = ∅ refers
to `not publish'. The strategy profile of authors, d : R+ → {f, g, ∅}F is the vector function
d(v) = (d1(v), . . . , dF (v)).
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Upon receiving a papers, the editor of journal j can observe the quality of papers. The editor
accepts the best papers subject to the journal capacity constraint. This implies that each field
journal has a threshold
tf := tf (d) = inf
{
w ∈ R+
∣∣∣∣ nf ∫ ∞
w
1df (v)=fh(v)dv ≤ κf
}
(9)
such that journal f accepts a submission with idea value v if and only if v ≥ tf . Similarly, the
general journal has a threshold
tg := tg(d) = inf
w ∈ R+
∣∣∣∣ ∑
f∈F
nf
∫ ∞
w
1df (v)=gh(v)dv ≤ κg
 (10)
and accepts submissions with idea v ≥ tg. We shall denote by t := (t1, . . . , tF , tg) the vector
of thresholds of the journals.
A journal submission decision rule d : R+ → {f, g, ∅}F yields, for each field journal f ∈ F ,
the expected quality of papers:
Af (d) =
nf
∫∞
tf (d)
1df (v)=f vh(v)dv
nf
∫∞
tf (d)
1df (v)=fh(v)dv
(11)
Similarly, the expected quality of papers in a general journal is
Ag (d) =
∑
f∈F nf
∫∞
tg(d)
1df (v)=g vh(v)dv∑
f∈F nf
∫∞
tg(d)
1df (v)=gh(v)dv
. (12)
The utility from publishing in a journal is a function of its quality of a journal and its
readership. Authors prefer journals that are read by more authors as their ideas can then have
greater impact. The readership of the general journal is
ng =
∑
f∈F
αfnf (13)
whereas the readership of a field journal is nf . The parameter αf reflects the importance that
authors within a field places on the general journal. It is an important parameter in our analysis.
Authors also care about the expected quality of the papers published in the journal. The
utility of submitting a paper of quality vi to field journal f ∈ F is:
Uf (vi|d) =
 nfAf (d) if vi ≥ tf (d)−1 otherwise. (14)
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Similarly, the utility of submitting a paper to general journal g is:
Ug(vi|d) =
 ngAg (d) if vi ≥ tg(d)−1 otherwise. (15)
Hence, for both field and general interest journals, the utility is the product of the readership of
the journal and the expected quality of its papers. The utility of not publishing is: U∅(vi) = 0.
As rejection leads to a payoff of −1, authors only submit to a journal if they are assured of
publication.
The author's utility maximisation problem is
max
j∈{f,g,∅}
Uj(vi|d), (16)
The corresponding reaction function is
pf (vi|d) = argmax
j∈{f,g,∅}
Uj(vi|d) (17)
Authors use the following tie-breaking rule in case of equal utilities: their first preference is
to publish in their own field journal, their second preference is to publish in a general interest
journal, and their least preferred alternative is not to publish at all.
Summarising, journals are platforms connecting authors and readers. The reader side is kept
relatively simple (a field journal is read by a single field, and the general interest journal is read by
a fraction of all fields). The author side is modelled more explicitly. The decision by an author to
submit to a journal creates an externality on other authors. This is typical of models of platform
competition. However, the nature of the externality is somewhat different and depends on the
quality of the user's product, that is, users with high quality ideas impose a positive externality
on the other platform users, and users with low quality ideas (lower than the platform average)
impose a negative externality on the other platform users.
A (Nash) equilibrium is an author strategy profile d : R+ → {f, g, ∅}F , such that ∀f ∈ F ,
∀v ∈ R+:
df (v) = pf (v)
Observe that the payoff from publishing in field journal f versus the general journal g is the
same for all authors (within the same field), and this utility is higher than not publishing at all.
Given our assumption that for all fields f ∈ F , κf+κg < nf , this means that the journal capacity
constraint must be binding. So it is the case that in every field f ∈ F a mass of κf authors
submit their paper to the field journal f , and across all fields, the total measure of submissions
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to the general journal equals κg, i.e.,
∑
f∈F
nf
∫ ∞
tg(d)
1df (v)=gh(v)dv = κg (18)
It follows that the authors with the best ideas submit their paper to their field journal or the
general journal, while the authors with the worst ideas in every field do not submit their paper
at all.
In principle, for any field, there are four possible decision rules.
1. An author with quality v < tf submits to no journal, quality tf ≤ v < tg submits to a field
journal, and quality v ≥ tg submits to the general journal. For this to be optimal it must
be that nfAf (d) < ngAg(d), or equivalently,
Af (d)
Ag(d)
<
ng
nf
. (19)
2. An author with quality v < tg submits to no journal, quality tg ≤ v < tf submits to the
general journal, and v ≥ tf submit to the field journal. For this to be optimal it must be
that nfAf (d) ≥ ngAg(d), or equivalently,
Af (d)
Ag(d)
≥ ng
nf
. (20)
3. An author with quality v < tf submits to no journal, and quality v ≥ tf submits to a field
journal. No one submits to the general journal. For this to be optimal it must be that
nfAf (d) ≥ ngAg(d).
4. An author with quality v < tg submits to no journal, and quality v ≥ tg submits to the
general journal. This decision rule is never optimal since κf + κg < nf . So authors with
quality v < tg have an incentive to deviate and submit to the field journal.
We plot the three feasible decision rules in Figure 10.
To summarize: any equilibrium involves a combination of decision rules I, II and III and the
capacity constraint is binding for all the field journals and the general journal. This sets the
stage for a characterization of the circumstances under which different types of equilibrium can
arise.
For expositional simplicity, suppose that all fields are equal sized, ∀f ∈ F : nf = n, the
capacity of the field journals is equal, ∀f ∈ F : κf = κ, and the fraction of general journal
readership is the same across fields, ∀f ∈ F : αf = α. With these restrictions in place, we are
ready to state our main result.
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Figure 10: Three possible cases of author submission rules in equilibrium
Proposition 1. Suppose that ∀f ∈ F : nf = n, κf = κ, and αf = α. There exist numbers K1
and K2, with K1 < 1 < K2, such that the following is true.
1. If αF ≤ K1, the unique equilibrium involves every field using decision rule II. The journal
impact ratio is K2.
2. If αF > K2, the unique equilibrium involves every field using decision rule I. The journal
impact ratio is given by A˜f (F )/A˜g(F ).
3. If K1 < αF ≤ K2, in addition to the outcomes mentioned above, equilibrium may exhibit
hybrid outcomes, with authors in some fields using decision rule I, while authors in other
fields use decision rule II or III.
The proof is presented in Appendix C.
To develop a sense for the way in which the key parameters shape equilibrium outcomes we
work through an example.
Example 1.
There are three parameters, number of fields (F ), field size (nf ), journal capacity (κ), and
readership for the general interest journal (α). Suppose that each field has nf = 100 authors.
The quality of ideas in each field is has exponential distribution, h(x) = e−x, with average quality
λ = 1. The readership share of the general interest journal is αf = 0.05, independently of the
field. All journals j (field and general interest) have a publication capacity of κj = 20.
We develop the relation between the number of fields and the influence ratios with the help
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Figure 11: Journal Influence Ratio and Number of Fields
of Figure 11. For F < 10 there is a unique equilibrium in which the field journal is the preferred
journal in all fields: the journal influence ratio Af (d)/Ag(d) is larger than 1.6. For F > 32,
there is a unique equilibrium in which the general journal is preferred in all fields. The journal
influence ratio is below 0.5 and slightly decreasing in F . Between F = 10 and F = 32, there
are multiple equilibria. For F ∈ (21, 32), the two equilibria described above are the only two
equilibria. For F ∈ (10, 20), there are also hybrid equilibria that combine decision rules I and III.
In these equilibria, the journal influence ratio for fields in which the general journal is preferred
is illustrated with `x', whereas the journal influence ratio for fields in which the field journal is
preferred are illustrated with `+'. We observe that the number of hybrid equilibria decreases
with F . In fact, for F ∈ (16, 20), there are only three equilibria, the two `pure' equilibria and
one hybrid equilibrium (in which the general journal is preferred in one field and absent in the
remaining F − 1 fields).
4.1 Using theory to understand the empirical trends
This section uses the theoretical model to develop an understanding of the forces that led to
the dominance of the Top 5 journals in the 1970-1995 period and the relative stability of this
dominance in the period since 1995.
The analysis, as summarized in the Proposition 1 and the example, draws attention to the
key role of the number of journals and the readership of the general journal. In particular, both
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Figure 12: Growth of Economics: 1970-2013. Source: EconLit
these factors push toward a greater dominance of the general journal.
Turning to the empirical context in economics, note that in the 1980's and early 1990's there
were two major and interrelated developments. The first development was a significant growth
in economics  in terms of number of journals and papers published. Figure 12 presents data on
the number of journals listed in EconLit and the number of articles published in those journals
every year.18 The growth in the number of journals is very large  from 196 journals in 1970 to
over 500 in 1995, and further on to 1312 in 2013. The number of articles also increased massively,
from 5066 in 1970 to 15000 in 1995, and further on to 47556 in 2013. It is useful to think of this
growth as arising out of both the increase in number of journals and an increase in number of
authors within a field.
The second development was a standardization of PhD programmes, with an increasing
dominance of top US schools at the global level. This was highly correlated with changes in
the broader intellectual and cultural environment, that shifted markedly in favor of mainstream
economics due to the rise of leadership of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, and the
collapse of communism; for an influential exposition of this development, see Fukuyama (1992).
We interpret this as an increase in the readership of the general journal.
Proposition 1 draws attention the role of an increase in the number of journals and readership
of the general journal. It shows that these trends will push toward the equilibrium with a
dominant general journal. This is consistent with the empirical trends in journal influence until
1995.
Consider next the period after 1995, the Top Field journals ratio remained fairly stable
(possibly with a slight decline). The example suggests that, once we are in the general journal
18EconLit is a bibliography of economics journals compiled by the editors of the Journal of Economic Literature.
We consider EconLit to illustrate the growth of the discipline, instead of the WoS because EconLit shows the
evolution of practically the entire discipline while the coverage of journals listed in the WoS mainly increase in
the mid 2000s.
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dominated space, further increases in number of fields has a small effect on the ratio, see Figure
10. This tendency has probably been reinforced by the growth in the number of leading field
journals. To get an impression of the growth in field journals, we present evidence on new
journals after 1985, for some leading fields of economics (they are all drawn from our list of 100
journals used to construct the citation data set).
• Economic Theory: Games and Economic Behaviour (1989), Economic Theory (1991),
American Economic Journal Microeconomics (2009), Theoretical Economics (2006).
• Macroeconomics: Review of Economic Dynamics (2001), American Economic Journal-
Macroeconomics (2009).
• Econometrics: Econometric Theory (1988), Journal of Applied Econometrics (1987), Em-
pirical Economics (2002),Quantitative Economics (2006),
• International Trade: , Review of International Economics (1992), Review of World Eco-
nomics (2003).
• Development: Journal of Population Economics (1992), Journal of Economic Growth
(1996), Journal of Economic Geography (2002).
Turning, finally, to the Tier 2 journals after 1995, the main observation is that the journal
influence ratio recovered. The model does not explicitly consider Tier 2 general journals, but we
believe that the discussion on field journals is helpful to understand this recovery. The number
of Tier 2 journals remained constant until fairly recently (see the discussion of Quantitative
Economics and Theoretical Economics, in Section 3). As the size of the profession expanded,
we expect that the number of good papers increased. Card and DellaVigna (2013) have shown
that the capacity of Top 5 journals declined over this period. Taking these factors together, we
would expect that (under suitable conditions on the distribution of ideas), high quality papers
would be unable to publish in Top 5 and be pushed toward the Tier 2 journals This could make
the Tier 2 more similar to Top 5 journals, and help explain the significant revival of the leading
empirical journal  Review of Economics and Statistics  in this period.
5 Sociology
To locate these developments in economics in a broader context, we study citations in another
social science: sociology.
We consider three top General Journals  American Journal of Sociology, American Soci-
ological Review, Social Forces  and 6 top field journals  Administrative Science Quarterly,
Demography, Journal of Health and Social Behavior, Social Networks, Social Psychology Quar-
terly, Social Science & Medicine over the period 1970-2017. The total number of articles is 46272.
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Figure 13: Journal Influence in Sociology
The data on citation counts and references is taken from the WoS. We first present in Figure
13a the evolution of the average impact factor ratio of Top Field journals relative to the Top 3
generalist journals. We find that in the period 1975 to 1995, there was a trend of increase in
influence of top field journals relative to the top 3 journals, the impact factor ratio increased
from 0.56 in 1975 to 0.86 in 1995 and then it remained relatively stable till 2017. As a result, by
2017, top field journals were on average almost as influential as general interest journals. Figure
13b shows that the journal that contributed the most to the increase in the Top field impact
factor ratio was Administrative Science Quarterly with an increase in Impact Factor from 1.98
in 1975 to 4.95 in 1995, when the impact factor ratio of Administrative Science Quarterly almost
double the average impact factor of the Top 3 journals.19
Thus the trends in sociology were quite different as compared to economics. How can we
account for this difference?
We now relate the developments in sociology to aspects of our model. The first point concerns
growth in discipline: Figure 14 suggests that until 1995, there was only modest growth in the
overall scale of the research in sociology (as compared to economics).20 Second, there also
appears to have been no large scale change in the broader intellectual environment comparable
to economics. Indeed, Fourcade et al. (2015) and Angrist et al. (2020) show that economics is
relatively more insular as compared to the other social sciences. In particular, Fourcade et al.
(2015) have argued that a major distinguishing feature of economics, relative to sociology, is the
much stronger cohesion of economics: different fields within sociology do not cite each other a
great deal more than their citations of non-sociology journals. By contrast, economics journals
19We note that the trends on Top Field versus Top General journals is robust: it also holds if we were to exclude
the Administrative Science Quarterly.
20We consider data from the WoS to compare the growth of the two disciplines using the same bibliography
source. The coverage of journals listed in the WoS changed substantially in 2005, and this leads us to drop the
years after 2005, as we do not know if the discipline grew due to an increase in fields size or due to an increase in
the WoS coverage.
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Figure 14: Sociology versus Economics: 1980-2004. Source: Web of Science.
rarely cite research outside economics. We interpret this as saying that the readership of the
general journal is low in sociology and that it has not increased over time. Proposition 1 suggests
that in the absence of a major expansion in sociology and with a low readership of the general
journal, sociology lies in the intermediate region, with a hybrid outcome  field journals dominate
in some fields, while the general journal dominates in other fields. The precise configuration at
any moment will depend on whether a field is growing or shrinking (possibly due to exogenous
reasons). This is in line with the trends in sociology over the 1970-2017 period.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies the trends in the influence of journals in economics over a period spanning
almost five decades, from 1970 to 2017. At the start, in the early 1970's, a number of journals
had similar influence, but by 1995 the five general journals  QJE, AER, RES, Econometrica,
and JPE  had acquired a major lead. The top 5 journals were being cited around 4 times
as much as other leading journals. This trend also holds if we consider instead the fraction of
most influential articles being published in economics and if we take into account the birth of
several new journals. In the period since 1995, Tier 2 journals like review of Economics and
Statistics have made a recovery, but the state of the other leading journals remains more or less
unchanged. To place these developments in a wider context, we studied the trends in sociology.
The picture there is very different: the relative influence of top general journals  American
Journal of Sociology, American Sociological Review, and Social Forces  actually declined over
the 1975-1995 period, and by 2017 it was only very slightly higher the influence of the leading
field journals.
A model of journals as `platforms' is developed to help put these changes in perspective. In
this model, there is a set of authors spread across research fields. Authors get ideas (of varying
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quality). They seek to publish in journals that are widely read. There is a journal for every
field  that publishes papers from that field only  and there is a general interest journal  that
publishes papers from every field. It is assumed that every author reads the journal in his field
and that a fraction of authors read the general interest journal. Every journal has a capacity
that determines the number of papers it can publish. Journals accept the best papers submitted
to them, subject to meeting this capacity. This models highlights the role of two factors  the
growth in the number of fields and greater readership of the general journal.
Turning to empirical trends, we note that there was significantly more expansion in research
in economics as compared to sociology. And, through the 1980's, there were major large scale
changes in the political and intellectual context  the decline of communism and the rise of
market liberalism  that reinforced the readership of general mainstream journals in economics.
No such large scale change occurred in sociology. This helps account for the trends over time
within economics and also the differences in trends between economics and sociology.
In the quarter of a century since 1995, the measured quality of the top general journals in
economics has remained stable, while their prestige appears to be have grown significantly. Is
the market value of a paper in a Top 5 general journal now out of line with its fundamental
value?
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A Journal List
1. AEJ-Applied Economics
2. AEJ-Macroeconomics
3. American Economic Review
4. American J. Agricultural Economics
5. American Political Science Review
6. Brookings Papers On Economic Activity
7. Cambridge J. Economics
8. Canadian J. Economics
9. J. Monetary Economics
10. Ecological Economics
11. Economic Development And Cultural
Change
12. Economic Inquiry
13. Economic Journal
14. Economics Letters
15. Economic Policy
16. Economic Theory
17. Econometric Theory
18. Econometrica
19. Economica
20. Empirical Economics
21. Energy Economics
22. Energy Policy
23. Energy Journal
24. Environmental & Resource Economics
25. European Economic Review
26. European J. Political Economy
27. Experimental Economics
28. Games And Economic Behavior
29. ILR Review
30. IMF Economic Review
31. Industrial And Corporate Change
32. International Economic Review
33. International J. Industrial Organization
34. J. Accounting & Economics
35. J. Accounting Research
36. J. Applied Econometrics
37. J. Banking & Finance
38. J. Business
39. J. Business & Economic Statistics
40. J. Business Venturing
41. J. Comparative Economics
42. J. Consumer Research
43. J. Development Economics
44. J. Development Studies
45. J. Economic Behavior & Organization
46. J. Economic Dynamics & Control
47. J. Economic Geography
48. J. Economic Growth
49. J. Economic Literature
50. J. Economics & Management Strategy
51. J. Economic Perspectives
52. J. Economic Surveys
53. J. Economic Theory
54. J. Econometrics
55. J. Empirical Finance
56. J. Environmental Economics And Man-
agement
57. J. The European Economic Association
58. J. Finance
59. J. Financial Economics
60. J. Financial Intermediation
61. J. Financial And Quantitative Analysis
62. J. Health Economics
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63. J. Human Resources
64. J. Industrial Economics
65. J. International Business Studies
66. J. International Economics
67. J. International Money And Finance
68. J. Labor Economics
69. J. Law & Economics
70. J. Law Economics & Organization
71. J. Money Credit And Banking
72. J. Political Economy
73. J. Population Economics
74. J. Public Economics
75. J. Risk And Uncertainty
76. J. Urban Economics
77. Labour Economics
78. Land Economics
79. Management Science
80. Marketing Science
81. Mathematical Finance
82. Oxford Bulletin Of Economics And
Statistics
83. Oxford Economic Papers-New Series
84. Oxford Review Of Economic Policy
85. Public Choice
86. Quarterly J. Economics
87. RAND J. Economics
88. Regional Science And Urban Economics
89. Regional Studies
90. Research Policy
91. Resource And Energy Economics
92. Review Of Economic Dynamics
93. Review Of Economics And Statistics
94. Review Of Economic Studies
95. Review Of Financial Studies
96. Review Of International Economics
97. Review Of World Economics
98. Scandinavian J. Economics
99. World Bank Economic Review
100. World Development
B Replicating Heckmann and Moktan (2020) across time
We now replicate Table 3 of Heckman and Moktan (2020) across decades (70s, 80s, 90s and
00s), using our set of 16 journals. Their analysis is based on the total number of citations of
the article. Instead, we use citations accumulated from the year of publication t to t + 9. This
10-years citations control for the year of publication of the article.
C Proof of Proposition 1
Let C ∈ {0, 1, . . . , F} be the fields in which decision rule I is used; in the other F − C fields
authors use either decision rule II or III. The key to a characterization of equilibrium is to derive
the cut-off thresholds for article quality, tf (d) and tg(d), and to delineate the conditions on the
parameters under which these thresholds can be satisfied.
Consider first an equilibrium in which all the fields use decision rule I, so, C = F . In
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Table 2: Volume-Adjusted Proportion of Articles: 19701979
Rank Journal Top 25%
1 JUE 11.2
2 JET 8.7
3 JPE 8.5
4 AER 8.1
5 JPub 8
6 ReStud 7.7
7 IER 7.2
8 ReStat 7.2
9 JLE 7.2
10 QJE 6.3
12 JME 5.5
13 ECMA 5.2
13 JIE 4.5
14 JDE 3.3
15 EJ 1.5
Journal Top 10%
JPE 12.6
AER 9.7
JME 9.1
ReStud 8.5
JET 8.3
JLE 7.3
JUE 7.3
JPub 7.3
ReStat 6.5
QJE 6.3
ECMA 6.2
IER 4.2
JIE 3.8
JDE 1.6
EJ 1.2
Journal Top 5%
JPE 15.3
JME 12.3
AER 11.9
ReStud 7.9
JET 7.7
JPub 7.1
ECMA 7.1
JLE 6.6
QJE 6
ReStat 5
IER 3.4
JUE 3.3
JIE 3.1
JDE 1.8
EJ 1.5
Journal Top 1%
JME 28.9
JPE 19.8
AER 13.1
JLE 8.3
ECMA 8.1
JET 6.7
ReStud 5.5
IER 4.3
ReStat 2.8
QJE 1.4
EJ 1.1
JUE 0.0
JIE 0.0
JPub 0.0
JDE 0.0
Note: Proportions of highly cited articles published by different journals. We use cites obtained during the
first 10 years after the publication of the article. Definition of journal abbreviations: QJEQuarterly Jour-
nal Of Economics, JPEJournal Of Political Economy, ECMAEconometrica, AERAmerican Economic Re-
view, ReStudReview Of Economic Studies, ReStatReview Of Economics And Statistics, EJEconomic Journal,
RANDRand Journal Of Economics, JDEJournal Of Development Economics, JPubJournal Of Public Eco-
nomics, JOEJournal Of Econometrics, JMEJournal Of Monetary Economics, JET-Journal of Economic Theory,
JIE-Journal of International Economics, JUE-Journal of Urban Economics, JLE-journal of Law and Economics.
Table 3: Volume-Adjusted Proportion of Articles: 19801989
Rank Journal Top 25%
1 ECMA 11
2 RAND 10.8
3 JPE 9.5
4 JME 8
5 ReStud 7.3
6 AER 7.2
7 JLE 7.1
8 QJE 6.3
9 JET 5.2
10 JOE 5.1
11 ReStat 4.3
12 JPub 4.1
13 JUE 3.7
14 JIE 3.2
15 IER 3.1
16 EJ 2.4
17 JDE 1.7
Journal Top 10%
ECMA 14.7
JPE 12.5
RAND 11.5
JME 9
AER 8
JLE 7.2
QJE 7.1
ReStud 6.8
JOE 4.6
JET 4.4
JPub 2.9
ReStat 2.7
IER 2.1
JIE 2.1
JUE 2
EJ 1.6
JDE 0.8
Journal Top 5%
ECMA 18.3
JPE 16.2
JME 10
AER 9.8
QJE 8.4
JLE 7.8
RAND 7.1
ReStud 5.4
JET 4.6
JOE 3.9
ReStat 2
JIE 2
JPub 1.3
EJ 1.3
IER 1.1
JDE 0.5
JUE 0.2
Journal Top 1%
ECMA 29.6
JPE 21.7
JME 12.7
JLE 7.6
AER 7.6
QJE 6.5
JOE 3.5
ReStud 2.3
RAND 2.3
JIE 1.9
JET 1.7
EJ 1.4
IER 1.1
JDE 0.0
JPub 0.0
JUE 0.0
ReStat 0.0
equilibrium the capacity constraint of the general journal is binding. So it follows that tg(d)
must solve nF (1−H(tg(d))) = κg. Simplifying and rearranging terms yields:
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Table 4: Volume-Adjusted Proportion of Articles: 19901999
Rank Journal Top 25%
1 QJE 13
2 JPE 11.1
3 ECMA 10.5
4 ReStud 8.5
5 AER 7.4
6 RAND 7.1
7 JME 6.2
8 JLE 6.2
9 JOE 5.3
10 ReStat 4
11 JPub 3.8
12 JIE 3.8
13 JET 3.3
14 JUE 3.1
15 JDE 2.7
16 IER 2.3
17 EJ 1.8
Journal Top 10%
QJE 21.8
JPE 14.5
ECMA 12.4
ReStud 8.7
AER 8
JME 5.6
JOE 5.3
RAND 3.9
ReStat 3.2
JLE 3.2
JIE 2.9
JPub 2.1
JET 2
IER 1.9
JDE 1.6
JUE 1.6
EJ 1.3
Journal Top 5%
QJE 23.7
JPE 17.2
ECMA 12.6
ReStud 10
AER 8.9
JOE 6.2
JME 4.6
JIE 3.5
IER 2.6
ReStat 2.4
RAND 2
JUE 1.4
JET 1.3
JLE 1.2
JDE 0.8
EJ 0.8
JPub 0.7
Journal Top 1%
QJE 34.7
ECMA 17.8
JPE 15.7
ReStud 8.2
JME 6.5
AER 6.4
JOE 4.3
JIE 4.2
IER 0.9
EJ 0.8
ReStat 0.6
JDE 0.0
RAND 0.0
JPub 0.0
JLE 0.0
JET 0.0
JUE 0.0
Table 5: Volume-Adjusted Proportion of Articles: 20002009
Rank Journal Top 25%
1 QJE 16.2
2 JPE 10.3
3 ECMA 9.7
4 AER 8.2
5 ReStud 7.5
6 ReStat 7.4
7 JIE 5.3
8 JME 4.3
9 JDE 4.3
10 JOE 4.2
11 JUE 4.1
12 JPub 4
13 JLE 4
14 RAND 3.9
15 EJ 2.8
16 IER 1.9
17 JET 1.9
Journal Top 10%
QJE 25.7
JPE 12.3
ECMA 10.3
AER 8.5
ReStud 7.8
ReStat 6.5
JIE 4.3
JOE 3.6
JDE 3.4
JME 3.3
JPub 2.8
JLE 2.5
RAND 2.3
JUE 2.3
EJ 2.3
IER 1.5
JET 0.6
Journal Top 5%
QJE 29.5
ECMA 12.8
JPE 12.4
AER 9.1
ReStud 7.2
ReStat 6.6
JIE 3.5
JOE 3.3
JME 2.9
JDE 2.6
RAND 2.1
EJ 2.1
JUE 2
JPub 2
IER 1.4
JLE 0.4
JET 0.1
Journal Top 1%
QJE 35.6
ECMA 13.2
AER 8.8
ReStat 8.4
JPE 8.2
ReStud 5.9
RAND 4.6
JOE 4.5
JIE 2.1
IER 2
JDE 2
JME 1.8
EJ 1.5
JPub 1.5
JET 0.0
JLE 0.0
JUE 0.0
tg(d) = H
−1
(
1− κg
nF
)
=: t˜g(F ). (21)
From equation (12), and noting that the denominator equals capacity κg, it follows that the
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Table 6: Volume-Adjusted Proportion of Articles: 20102017
Rank Journal Top 25%
1 QJE 13.2
2 ECMA 8.8
3 ReStud 8.5
4 ReStat 8.2
5 JPE 7.9
6 AER 7.6
7 EJ 5.7
8 JUE 5.4
9 JDE 5.3
10 JIE 5.2
11 JPub 4.8
12 RAND 4.3
13 JOE 3.9
14 JME 3.8
15 IER 2.9
16 JLE 2.5
17 JET 2
Journal Top 10%
QJE 20.9
AER 9.3
ECMA 9
JPE 9
ReStud 8.6
ReStat 7.7
EJ 5.1
JUE 5.1
JDE 5
JIE 4.2
JPub 3.6
RAND 3.5
JME 3.2
JOE 2.9
JLE 1.4
IER 1.1
JET 0.5
Journal Top 5%
QJE 27.5
ECMA 9.8
AER 9.1
JPE 8.3
ReStat 8.1
ReStud 6.7
JDE 5.4
EJ 4.1
JUE 4
JIE 3.6
JPub 3.1
JOE 3.0
JME 2.5
RAND 2.4
IER 1.1
JLE 0.9
JET 0.3
Journal Top 1%
QJE 37.3
AER 12.9
ECMA 12.0
ReStud 9.6
JPE 5.6
ReStat 4.3
JDE 3.2
JME 2.9
JPub 2.5
EJ 2.4
JIE 2.4
JOE 1.9
JUE 1.5
IER 1.4
RAND 0.0
JLE 0.0
JET 0.0
expected quality of the general journal is
Ag(d) =
nF
κg
∫ ∞
t˜g(F )
vh(v) dv =: A˜g(F )
The general journal is preferred to the field journal; from symmetry across fields, the threshold
for the field journal is equal across fields and must satisfy the equation:
n
(
H(t˜g(F ))−H(tf (d))
)
= κ. (22)
Substituting for t˜g(F ) from above, and simplifying, yields:
tf (d) = H
−1
(
1− κg
nF
− κ
n
)
=: t˜f (F ). (23)
The expected quality of every field journal is
Af (d) =
n
κ
∫ t˜g(F )
t˜f (F )
vh(v) dv =: A˜f (F )
It is optimal for individual authors to follow this decision rule if and only if submitting to
general journal yields higher utility than submitting to field journal, i.e., nA˜f (F ) < αnFA˜g(F ),
i.e.,
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αF >
A˜f (F )
A˜g(F )
(24)
We will refer to the ratio of quality of journals as the journal impact ratio: in this equilibrium
it is given by A˜f (F )/A˜g(F ).
Consider next an equilibrium in which authors in all fields prefer the field journal to the
general journal: C = 0. As the capacity constraint of every field journal is binding, by
symmetry of the fields the thresholds are the same in all fields and must solve the equation
n (1−H(tf (d))) = κ. Simplifying, and rearranging, yields
tf (d) = H
−1
(
1− κ
n
)
=: t¯f . (25)
It follows that the expected quality of a field journal is
Af (d) =
n
κ
∫ ∞
t¯f
vh(v) dv =: A¯f .
In all fields, the field journal is preferred to the general journal: so tg(d) solves
nF (H(t¯f )−H(tg(d))) = κg (26)
Substituting for t¯f and simplifying yields:
tg(d) = H
−1
(
1− κF + κg
nF
)
=: tˆg(0) (27)
The expected quality of the general journal is given by
Ag(d) =
nF
κg
∫ t¯f
tˆg(0)
vh(v) dv =: Aˆg(0)
It is optimal for authors in every field to follow this rule if and only if utility from the field
journal is greater than the utility from the general journal, i.e.,
αF ≤ A¯f/Aˆg(0). (28)
Consider next the case where authors in all fields make no submissions to the general journal:
this cannot occur in equilibrium, as there will exist authors with papers below their field journal
threshold who can derive positive utility by submitting their paper to the general journal that
has idle capacity.
The interest now turns to equilibria that exhibit a mix of decision rules. Consider the case
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where C fields use decision rule I while the remaining F − C fields use decision rule II. For a
field, f , that uses decision rule II the threshold for the field journal tf (g) = t¯f . Consequently,
the expected quality of the journal in such a field is Af (d) = A¯f . Next, consider the general
journal. In C fields, all authors with idea vi ≥ tg(d), and in the other F − C fields, all authors
with idea vi ∈ [tg(d), t¯f ) submit their paper to the general journal. This means that tg(d) solves
nC (1−H(tg(d))) + n(F − C) (H(t¯f )−H(tg(d))) = κg.
Substituting for t¯f and simplifying yields:
tg(d) = H
−1
(
1− κ(F − C) + κg
nF
)
=: tˆg(C). (29)
However, for this decision rule to be feasible it must be the case that tˆg(C) < t¯f or equivalently
κg > κC. Consequently, the expected quality of the general journal is
Ag(d) =
n
κg
(
C
∫ ∞
t¯f
vh(v) dv + F
∫ t¯f
tˆg(C)
vh(v) dv
)
=: Aˆg(C).
In fields that use decision rule I, authors submit their paper to field journal if vi ∈
[
tf (d), tˆg(C)
)
.
Hence, tf (d) solves n
(
H(tˆg(C))−H(tf (d))
)
. The solution is
tf (d) = H
−1
(
1− κ(2F − C) + κg
nF
)
=: tˆf (C) (30)
. The expected quality of the field journal is
Af (d) =
n
κ
∫ tˆg(C)
tˆf (C)
vh(v) dv =: Aˆf (C),
For fields that follow decision rule I, the journal impact ratio is
Af (d)
Ag(d)
=
Aˆf (C)
Aˆg(C)
(31)
and for fields that use decision rule II, the journal impact ratio is
Af (d)
Ag(d)
=
A¯f
Aˆg(C)
. (32)
Observe that authors will abide by decision rules I and II, respectively, if and only if their
utility is maximized in doing so. For the utility conditions to hold it must be that in fields that
follow decision rule I, the utility to general journal is larger, while in fields that follow decision
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rule II the utility from field journal is higher, i.e.,
Aˆf (C)
Aˆg(C)
< αF ≤ A¯f
Aˆg(C)
. (33)
Consider finally the equilibrium in which C fields where C ∈ {1, . . . , F−1} follow the decision
rule I while F−C fields follow decision rule III. The threshold for a field which abides by decision
rule III, tf (d) = t¯f . The expected quality of such a journal is Af (d) = A¯f . The threshold for
the general journal must solve the following condition: nC (1−H(tg(d))) = κg. Simplifying and
solving yields tg(d) = H
−1 (1− κgnC ) = t˜g(C) as in (21).
For decision rule III to be sustained in an equilibrium, it must also be the case that t¯f ≤ t˜g(C),
or equivalently, κg ≤ κC. Otherwise, authors with an idea between tg(d) and t¯f would submit
their paper to the general journal instead of the not submitting to a journal at all. The expected
quality of the journal is Ag(d) = A˜g(C). In fields that follow decision rule 1, authors submit their
paper to their field journal if vi ∈ [tf (d), t˜g(C)). Hence, tf (d) solves nC
(
H(t˜g(C))−H(tf (d))
)
=
κ, that is, tf (d) = t˜f (C). The corresponding field journal expected quality is Af (d) = A˜f (C).
The journal impact ratio for fields that follow decision rule I is
Af (d)
Ag(d)
=
A˜f (C)
A˜g(C)
(34)
and for fields that follow decision rule III the impact ratio is
Af (d)
Ag(d)
=
A¯f
A˜g(C)
. (35)
It is optimal for authors to abide by these rules if κg ≤ κC and
A˜f (C)
A˜g(C)
< αF ≤ A¯f
A˜g(C)
. (36)
Consider a combination of decision rules II and III: this would require that the threshold t¯f
be different across fields. This is not feasible as the fields are all of equal size and journals have
same capacity.
Taking the conditions for equilibrium existence (24), (28), (33) and (36) together, we can define
a lowerbound K1 and upperbound K2, such that decision rule II in all fields is the unique
equilibrium if αF ≤ K1, and decision rule I in all fields the unique equilibrium if αF > K2. To
define K1, we first define an auxiliary function, which combines the lower thresholds of (24), (33)
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and (36):
K(C) =
 Aˆf (C)/Aˆg(C) if 0 ≤ C <
κg
κ
A˜f (C)/A˜g(C) if
κg
κ ≤ C ≤ F
(37)
Then
K1 = min
C∈{1,...,F}
K(C). (38)
K2 is easier to define. Since both A˜g(C) and Aˆg(C) increase in C, it follows that A¯f/A˜g(C) and
A¯f/Aˆg(C) decrease in C. Hence, the maximum threshold over C ∈ {0, . . . , F − 1} is always
K2 =
A¯f (0)
Aˆg(0)
. (39)
This completes the proof.

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